NATO summit in Washington challenges multipolar world order, targets China and Asia
Fans flames of Ukraine war into Asia
After the Washington summit of NATO countries, the US-led western military alliance seems all set to expand its footprint in Asia, citing the growing threat from China.
That Beijing had become the whipping boy to justify NATO’s eastward expansion was recently visible in plain sight. In the meeting marking 75 years of existence of the post-war alliance that began on July 9, the grouping doubled down on China, slamming it for militarily bolstering Russia in its war against western-backed Ukraine. By listing China as a threat to Europe via Russia, the West sharpened its narrative that Beijing was a threat to world peace. The Atlantic alliance had already vilified the Middle Kingdom citing its so-called “expansionist” disposition in Asia where Beijing has been embroiled in maritime disputes in the South China Sea with several countries ranging from Vietnam to Brunei. The West and its Asian allies, especially Japan have also slammed the Chinese for destabilising the Indo-Pacific because Beijing has not ruled out the use of force to unify Taiwan with the mainland. In Washington, NATO had therefore arced a new western pincer to target China.
On their part, the Chinese were quick to pick the latent intent of the Washington summit. "The hype and intensification of the China issue serve as a catalyst for NATO to accelerate and strengthen its presence, influence, and actions globally, especially in the Asia-Pacific region," China’s state run daily Global Times quoted Li Haidong, a professor at the China Foreign Affairs University as saying.
In case NATO expands into Asia, it is quite obvious that Japan and South Korea—top US military allies in the region—would become the fulcrums for the grouping’s dilation. It was therefore not surprising that both Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and his South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol were present as invitees to the three-day Washington summit that ended on July 12.
Behind the scenes too, Japan and South Korea have been in overdrive to mass produce weapons that can be used both in the Ukrainian and Asian theatres. In June, the U.S. and Japan inaugurated the U.S.-Japan Defence Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment (DICAS) forum to urgently coordinate co-development, co-production and co-sustainment of munitions, ships and planes.
In hi-end weaponry, the US and Japan are engaged in developing Glide Phase Interceptor to counter hypersonic missiles. South Korea, on its part, is feverishly working to boost military exports to NATO countries amid the war in Ukraine. For instance, South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace, has secured a $947 million order to supply Romania—a NATO member--54 K9 self-propelled howitzers and 36 K10 ammunition resupply vehicles.
The K9 mobile artillery guns are also expected to make their way to Poland, Norway, Finland, and Estonia—NATO states close to Ukraine.
Aware of military activism in Tokyo and Seoul, the Chinese have officially warned Japan and South Korea not to become the “vanguard” of NATO expansion in the Asia-Pacific. On Thursday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, Lin Jian asserted that the Asia-Pacific does not need military blocs. He urged Tokyo and Seoul to adhere to the right path of Asia-Pacific cooperation, play a constructive role in maintaining and promoting peace, stability, development, and not act as the "vanguard" of NATO's Asia-Pacific expansion.
The frenetic response from NATO to cover the Asian flank can be attributed to the worsening ground situation in Ukraine. In fact, by all counts, Ukraine has lost the initiative in its conflict with Russia, despite the hefty injection of advanced weaponry worth billions of dollars by NATO countries to Kiev. It is evident the Russia commands the military balance of power in Ukraine, especially after Moscow forged a military alliance with North Korea—another cause of worry for the West, and a key element in the globalisation of the Ukraine war.
The North Korea factor: Russia opened up the Korean flank during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s masterstroke visit to North Korea that began on June 18.
Caption: Russian President Vladimir Putin with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un in Pyongyang
During the visit Putin managed to strike a grand bargain with its eastern neighbour, which would impart Moscow the stamina to fight, if required, a long war with NATO backed Ukraine.
What did Russia get from North Korea that would be valuable in the battles ahead with Ukraine?
During the visit Russia and North Korea signed a foundational agreement, which provided the legal basis for militarily supporting each other in case any one of the two parties is attacked.
In return for providing a security umbrella, North Korea was expected to supply Russia with war material, if not boots on the ground.
War material: Shells are key to Russia’s war efforts, and its artillery-cantered armed forces require adequate and sustainable supplies of ammunition to maintain its offensive. North Korea has massive surplus capacity to produce artillery shells.
It is estimated that North Korea can currently produce 2 million 152mm shells per year. According to some South Korean experts, this capacity can be doubled if not tripled to a whopping 4-6m shells. Combine this with Russia’s own capacity to produce 4-5 million shells. In comparison the entire combined West has been unable to deliver even 1 million shells to Ukraine. On its own, the U.S. has declared that it could ramp up capacity to 430,000 a year. By 2028, it is targeting a yearly production of 960K—nowhere close to what Russia and North Korea’s would be able to jointly muster.
By the time Ukraine would be able to access a little over 2 million shells, Russia would have five times that number in its arsenal.
What does North Korea get from Russia?
North Korea has made three visible gains following Putin’s visit to Pyongyang.
First, the military pact signed with Russia imparts Pyongyang fool-proof security. Already an undeclared atomic power, North Korea when backed by Russia—the world’s strongest nuclear power—would possess a fierce nuclear deterrent that would insulate it against any atomic or conventional attack from its adversaries, chiefly South Korea, and the United States.
Even prior to the pact, North Korea had a formidable arsenal of atomic weapons. According to conservative estimates, North Korea is in possession of at least 100 nuclear weapons. The US think tank RAND corporation estimates that by 2027, North Korea could have stockpiled around two hundred nuclear weapons.
Regarding nuclear delivery systems, North Korea’s Hwasong-15 missile has a potential range of 13,000 kilometres (8,100 miles). That would bring large swathes of US territory within its target range. If fired along a flatter flight path, this weapon could strike anywhere inside the US mainland. Pyongyang has further claimed that its Hwasong-17 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) has 15,000 kilometres (9,321 miles) reach, giving the North Koreans multiple options to target the United States.
Besides, North Korea has developed the capacity to nuke the U.S. from the sea using hard to detect submarines. Its Pukkuksong-5 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) can strike at 3000 kilometre bringing Guam, a top US naval base in the West Pacific, within striking range.
Second, the Russians appear to be helping North Korea with military satellite technology. It is suspected that North Korea has received Russian technical assistance for its Malligyong 1 spy satellite.
This comes as no surprise as North Korea had clearly flagged its intent to secure Russian space technology when Kim met Putin in September 2023. Significantly, the meeting took place at the Vostochny cosmodrome, symbolising North Korea’s active interest in benefitting from Russian space advances.
By helping its North Korean ally to bolster its nuclear and conventional deterrent, Russia would eventually manage to impose enormous pressure on the US and its regional allies—chiefly Japan and South Korea--from its eastern flank. That leverage in the East would effectively neutralises the nuclear threat that Russia is likely to face from the Ukrainian flank. It is therefore not surprising the Putin inked the strategic partnership with North Korea after NATO decided to supply Kiev with the nuclear capable F-16 fighter jets. The Russians are fully aware that the F-16 fighters can drop the B-61 tactical nukes on Russia. But after signing mutual defence pact with North Korea, Russia has scored its nuclear equaliser and much more.
Third, Putin’s breakthrough visit has solved North Korea’s biggest problem—food security. Russia, an agri-powerhouse both in terms of food and fertilizer production, is well positioned to end North Korea’s hunger problem.
To ensure delivery of supplies, Putin also signed an agreement to build a brand-new bridge over the Tumannaya river. This road bridge would supplement the already existing rail connectivity between the two countries.
With NATO’s expansion in Asia to counter China on the radar, it will be only natural for Beijing to further harden its stand towards the U.S.—the leader of the alliance—and reinforce its bonds with Moscow. It is important here to understand that China and Russia’s outreach towards each other is deeply geopolitical, and even ideological as both are supporters of a multipolar world. In recent years, Beijing, and Moscow during the course of the Arab Spring understood that the West, in order to consolidate its unipolarity was toppling independent minded governments, through a string of regime changes in West Asia and North Africa. The Russia-China partnership came into its own when the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was toppled in October 2011. Thereafter the leaderships of the two countries understood that after Libya, Syria would be next on the regime -change list. And in case Syrian leader Bashar Al Assad was toppled, Iran would be next in the firing line. That would be disastrous as a pro-west counterrevolution in Iran would expose China and Russia as the ultimate prize in the regime-change game. Consequently, Moscow and Beijing realising the Syria was their first line of defence, with Iran as the second, have prevented regime change in Damascus. Besides, they have cultivated Iran, drawing it into two groupings where they have a say—the BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), thereby smashing Tehran’s isolation. It will therefore not be surprising that when confronted with NATO expansion in Asia, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran may forge an informal alliance thereby completely polarising the Asian continent.
As NATO railed against China at the Washington summit, Beijing defiantly poked the grouping in its eye by derisively sending its troops to Belarus, Russia’s top ally for a joint military exercise. The presence of Chinese troops in a geopolitically sensitive nation that shares borders with five countries including Russia, Ukraine and Poland was a clear statement of defiance from Beijing, demonstrating that it was hardly in a mood to cop up NATO’s puerile bullying.
In the struggle for a new world order amid the Ukraine war, the battle for geopolitical one-upmanship may not be confined to Europe and Asia alone. In fact, the competition is likely to cascade to the Global South, which is in active transition once again. In Africa, countries of the Sahel—Chad, Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Niger-- are already in the battle cry mode against France, the former colonial power, and are openly seeking Russian support.
As the second wave of decolonisation in Africa gathers speed, new opportunities are opening up for emerging economies such as Russia, China, and India to anchor their presence in this resource rich region. On a macro- scale, the BRICS+ representing the rising tide of emerging economies and the Global South along with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a pan-Eurasian grouping, are ever-increasingly likely to challenge the hegemony of the G-7 and NATO in the now seething contest across multiple geographies, including Asia, between aspirants of a multipolar world and those who still cling on to the failed idea of unipolarity.
2.Why the failed coup in Bolivia is all about upcoming Lithium wars and green economy
Caption: On June 26, Bolivian troops loyal to Army Commander Gen. Juan Jose Zuniga apparently tried to remove President Luise Arce in a military coup.
There is considerable confusion about the failed coup in Bolivia. On June 26, a group of Bolivian military officers led by General Juan Jose Zuniga, who was removed as army commander the previous day, occupied the square in La Paz, in front of the Presidential palace. President Luis Arce called the military's actions an attempted coup d’état.
However, the soldiers returned to their barracks, on the orders of Commander-designate Jose Wilson Sanchez Velasquez, following a much-publicised verbal confrontation between Arce and Zuniga inside the presidential palace.
The back story: Incidentally Zuniga was sacked after he threatened at the beginning of the week to arrest former President Evo Morales if the latter tried to run for president again during next year’s elections. He had also demanded that existing lot of cabinet ministers should be changed and “political prisoners” such as Jeanine Áñez, who assumed power after 2019’s military coup, but has been subsequently jailed.
Caption: Bolivia’s charismatic former President Evo Morales (center)
There are three plausible theories that have been floated to explain the dramatic happenings in La Paz.
First, Arce stage-managed a fake coup. It is defeat in the public eye would shore up his failing popularity, driven by a deep economic crisis that has engulfed Bolivia. Arce can then leverage his support to win the presidential elections slated next year.
Arce may be reaching out to the people on account of a raging intra-socialist rivalry. The incumbent President feels threatened by the charismatic and highly popular former President Evo Morales. Though Morales was ousted in a military coup in 2019 and barred from contesting again, Arce fears that a constitutional loophole maybe found that would enable the former President to contest elections again in 2025. The bad blood between the Arce and Morales is visible in plain sight. Morales has accused Arce, whose stock in the socialist camp is already low, of faking the coup.
Second, sensing large scale public discontent, Zuniga, the former army chief, had tried to mount an opportunistic coup, which, he assumed, would cause the immediate collapse of Arce’s government, without causing a mass upsurge in the ousted president’s favour.
Third, Arce has indeed weathered a botched-up coup attempt marshalled by the CIA with Zuniga at the front-end. But the apparent lack of preparation, both at military end as well at a popular level to make the coup successful, as has been the case earlier when the CIA had mounted such undertakings in other countries in the region, raises questions about this theory.
Nevertheless, one thing is clear. Bolivia is now at the centre of an international rivalry—a battleground where Washington contests the growing influence of China and Russia in its supposed backyard. The root cause of this growing geopolitical contestation is Lithium, the prized feedstock of the industry 4.0 and the green economy.
Bolivia has vast reserves on Lithium. In fact, it has the largest deposits of the mineral in South America’s popularly known Lithium triangle that also includes Chile and Argentina. Bolivia has mammoth Lithium reserves that stand 21 million tonnes, outgunning Argentina’s 20, and Chile’s 11 million tonnes.
Unsurprisingly, China, that aspires to become the global leader of the green economy riding on the electric-vehicle revolution has majorly invested in tapping Bolivia’s Lithium reserves.
Earlier this year, Arce’s government finalised a major deal with Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (CATL), China’s largest battery producer, and CMOC, the mining giant that produces cobalt, the other essential mineral used in lithium-ion batteries that power electric-vehicles.
Following the deal China pledged to invest $1b for building production plants that would use Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE) in Bolivia’s Salar De Uyuni and Salar de Coipasa salt flats. State-owned producer Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB) is part of the consortium, which also includes Brunp, CATL’s recycling subsidiary. Together, they are slated to produce 25,000 tonnes of battery-grade lithium carbonate this year, with annual production scaling up to 100,000 tonnes by 2028.
Russia too is not far behind China in forking investments in Bolivia. In mid-December 2023, Russian state firm Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of Rosatom, signed a $450 million deal, giving Moscow access to Bolivia’s Lithium reserves.
Under the agreement, the Russian firm will launch a pilot project to produce lithium in Bolivia’s southern highlands. In a separate contract signed earlier in June 2023, Russia agreed to set up a lithium carbonate industrial complex in Pastos Grandes, in southwest Bolivia.
As Lithium begins to drive international geopolitical rivalries, it is obvious that the Lithium triangle comprising Bolivia, Chile and Argentina will become a battleground of grim contestation between the US on one side and China and Russia on the other. On the ground, it would mean an intense use of hard and soft power to foist favourable regimes in these countries.
In Argentina, government data shows that between 2020 and 2023, Chinese companies invested $3.2 billion in mining projects, including seven lithium projects. This figure is almost double that of U.S. companies, which financed three lithium projects. Last year, China absorbed more than 40 per cent of Argentina’s lithium exports. In comparison US imported a mere 9 per cent.
Nevertheless, the US hopes to mount a Lithium riposte in Argentina with the election of the right-wing pro-US government of Javier Milei. Tesla owner Elon Musk, the face of the US electric car industry is openly courting the Argentine President , to secure the supply of the mineral for car batteries. “I recommend investing in Argentina.” Musk wrote on X after meeting Millei in May.
After Argentina, it would not be surprising, if Bolivia becomes the epicentre of the powerplay of long knives, with Chile not too far behind. Lithium wars may have just begun adding another chapter in the bloody quest[aa1] for resources, dethroning oil, which since the early 20th century has been the king driving mega-wars, regime changes and assassinations embroiling global rivals.